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Abstract 
Income and income inequality increased substantially in the UK during the industrial revolution. Income inequality was 
the highest around 1880.This triggered enactments of more egalitarian tax and transfer system, which halved income 
inequality by the 1960s. Inequality has risen again with fiscal system reforms in the last five decades. By analysing 
solutions of a dynamic computable general equilibrium (DCGE) model we show how policies could be designed for the 
optimal equitable paths of UK economy in the 21st century. 
Keywords: growth, redistribution, fiscal policy in UK 
JEL classifications: H2, H3, D3, E6, O41, O52 
1 Introduction 
The annual average growth rate of GDP per capita in the UK was 0.08 percent between AD 1 and 1830 and 1.5 percent 
between 1830 and 2008.
1
 The unprecedented economic growth brought about by the industrial revolution and the 
development of trade, commerce and capitalism not only made the UK a global economic leader from 1750 to 1850, but 
also created wide gaps in the distribution of income and wealth between the rich and the poor. Analysing secular trends 
in income distribution, Kuznets (1955) found a widening of income inequality in England during the early phases of 
industrialization between 1780 and 1850, when the transition from the mercantilist state to the industrial society was 
most rapid. The process of urbanisation, lower death and higher birth rates, and rising rates of saving, investment, 
capital accumulation and profit contributed to this inequality, which remained high until 1875. After the seminal work 
of Meade and Stone (1941) on national accounts and input-output systems, more information became available. This led 
to improvements in economic modelling and analyses of the tax system and its impact on household income (Meade et 
al. (1978)). 
In an extensive study of the UK tax systems Mirrlees et al. (2010) recommend "a progressive, neutral tax system, that 
minimises economic distortions and is a right tool for achieving distributional objectives". They then conclude that 
"there are taxes that are fairer, less damaging, and simpler than those that we have now. To implement them will take a 
government … willing to put long term strategy ahead of short term tactics". They warn that "the costs of not doing so 
are very large … Economic welfare could be improved by many billions of pounds if the taxation of income, 
expenditure, profits, environmental externalities and saving were reformed." 
In this paper we construct a dynamic CGE model (DCGE) to simulate how such reforms relate to the relative prices of 
goods and services and factors of production, to growth, and to the distribution of consumption and income in the UK 
economy. 
The most recent analysis of the evolving patterns of income and consumption inequality in UK is in Blundell (2014), 
who models the process of income and consumption choices of households as a function of the variances or covariances 
of permanent and transitory shocks to the processes of income and consumption. He calibrates the dynamics of income 
and consumption inequality among the households to the PSID dataset from the US, and the BHPS (understanding 
society) dataset from the UK, to provide empirical validity to model predictions. 
By incorporating inter-household income patterns, and substitution of labour across skill categories and of capital across 
sectors of production, the DCGE model proposed here aims to find the dynamically efficient path of the relative price 
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system, and the optimal (and more equal) distribution of income that is feasible within the time and resource constraints 
of the economy as a whole. It aims to find out the optimal path of taxes, public spending and borrowing that would 
insure households against such income and consumption shocks and would allow them to maximise their life-time 
welfare in anticipation of shocks to preferences, technologies or public policies. The model assumes an efficient 
financial market for channelling savings to investments. The model‟s results show the path of the economy that would 
result from the recent reforms of 20, 40 and 45 percent direct tax rates for low, middle and high income households or 
from a 20 percent VAT or from a 20 percent corporate income tax rate or from the unification of the benefit system. It 
takes account of the more complicated economy-wide income and substitution effects across sectors and households 
over time. 
Since the level of lifetime utility is the most relevant indicator of the welfare of households, we focus on the growth and 
inequality in it as caused by the changes in the relative prices that are distorted by fiscal policy measures including taxes, 
transfers and public spending. The level of welfare of every household can rise if the growth rate is higher, leading to 
more consumption of goods and services. Richer households often benefit more from it than the poor households, yet 
more equality of income, if associated with a lower growth rate, can reduce the level of the lifetime utility of every 
household as they have less for consumption and leisure. 
It is also clear from the model that tax reforms designed to tackle short-run problems have detrimental effects on 
long-run growth, and may not be helpful in reducing the inequality in the distribution of income. Thus there is a clear 
trade-off between growth and equality. Greater equality in income alone does not automatically guarantee greater 
welfare for everyone, no matter what the configuration of the social welfare function may be. The levels of consumption 
and utility cannot grow persistently when the economy is not growing. 
Redistribution occurs also through the provision of public goods. In the existing structure of public expenditure, the UK 
government spends about 65 percent of its budget on cash and in kind benefits. The remaining 35 percent of its 
expenditure is for pure public goods. Thus, it is important to consider both the revenue and spending components of the 
public budget, and income and expenditure sides of households simultaneously, while evaluating effects of fiscal policy 
on the price system and the allocation of resources on growth and redistribution of income. As taxes and transfers affect 
different categories of households and firms differently, a multi-household multi-sectoral DCGE model of the UK is an 
appropriate modelling framework for such analysis. Developing and applying such a model is the main contribution of 
this paper. 
1.1 Rise of public sector and income inequality in the UK 
Motivated by sentiments against rising inequality
2
 policy makers in the UK were able to promulgate a series of 
entitlement laws and include clauses for income redistribution in regular acts such as the Income Tax Act (1853) and the 
Finance Act (1909). In his “Poverty: A Study of Town Life”, Joseph Rowntree (1902) had made several 
recommendations to fulfil the basic needs of poor people, such as social housing, and services including education and 
health, which required mobilisation of additional revenues from direct and indirect taxes. Adoption of an egalitarian 
tax-and-transfer system in this manner raised the size of the state in the economy to 12 percent of the national income 
by 1914; it was barely 3 percent in 1665. Further expansion of the public sector relative to GDP occurred when the UK 
financed World Wars I and II by debt, which left a legacy of a large public sector in the UK. Acts aimed at relieving the 
war-devastated economy resulted in public commitment to the social security system as proposed in the Beveridge 
report of 1942, which raised the share of the public sector to around 40 percent of GDP. It has remained at around that 
level since then (see Table 1). 
The share of the income going to top five percent fell from 46 percent in 1880 to 24 percent in 1947, while the share of 
the bottom 85 percent rose from 41 percent to 55 percent, as several entitlement laws relating to the tax and transfer 
system enacted by the UK parliament made the UK one of the most egalitarian countries in the world by 1960s. The 
large tax wedge between the pre- and post-tax income, contributed to a Gini coefficient of net income of just around 25 
percent (see Table1). 
By the 1970s, the tax-and-transfer system that began in the 1800s had eliminated poverty among households in the 
bottom income group. But income inequality rose again after a series of reforms of that system began in the 1980s 
(Jenkins (1966) and Atkinson and Voitchovsky (2011)). As shown in Table 1, the Gini coefficient of post-tax income, 
rose from 28.6 in the 1970s to 38.3 in the 2000s. Higher inflation, the principal burden of which falls on the low income 
households, has further reinforced this process. The average income of a household in the bottom decile is only 7 
percent of the average income of an individual in the top decile, as can be seen from Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Post tax income distribution in the UK in 2010 (Data source: ONS). 
 
Table 1. Fiscal policy, Growth and Inequality in the UK: Recent Trends 
 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2016* 
Gov. revenue/GDP (%) 41.1 40.0 41.1 42.5 37.1 37.3 37.8* 
Gov. spending/GDP (%) 39.0 40.2 44.4 44.7 40.4 40.7 39.0* 
Budget surplus/GDP (%) 2.0 -0.2 -3.3 -2.2 -3.3 -3.4 -5.5* 
Debt to GDP ratio (%) 145.0 89.6 49.9 40.6 34.6 34.2 85.0* 
Inflation, % p.a. 4.2 3.6 13.6 7.6 3.6 2.5 2.0* 
Growth rate, % p.a. 2.5 3.1 2.4 2.5 2.2 1.7 2.0* 
Gini of pre-tax income (/100) 41.3 32.1 43.3 48.8 52.4 51.7 52* 
Gini of post-tax income (/100) 35.4 25.1 28.6 33.8 38.6 38.3 39* 
Data source: ONS, IFS and http://www.ukpublicsp ending.co.uk/index.php; HM-Treasury. Gini for 1950 and 1960 
rely on Stark (1972), Barna (1945), Nicholson (1964). * => an estimate. 
 
Despite a rise in post-tax income inequality beginning in the 1980s (which took place in contradiction of the Kuznets 
hypothesis), the UK still underwent a significant amount of income redistribution under the existing tax-benefit system. 
Table 2 shows how, when we subtract direct and indirect taxes from cash and in-kind benefits, the net gains fall with 
household income. For instance in 2009, the net tax paid by an average household in the top 20 percent income group 
was around twenty thousand pounds - just enough to finance cash and in-kind benefits received by two average 
households in the bottom 40 percent, each of whom got a net amount of about ten thousand pounds, twice as much as 
their own contributions to the Treasury. The average size of benefits has risen also with the growth of the economy. The 
extent of redistribution is less in the middle income groups, where the net amount received by the third quintile almost 
matches the net tax payment by those in the fourth quintile. 
Table 2. Net Effects of Taxes and Transfers to an Average Household, by Income Quintile, 2009 
 Benefits Taxes Net 
Gain/loss  Cash In-kind Total Direct Indirect Total 
Bottom 6,883 7,555 14,438 -1,195 -2,965 -4,160 10,278 
  2nd 8,280 7,252 15,535 -2,200 -3,466 -5,666 9,866 
  3rd  6,139 7,088 13,225 -4,850 -4,459 -9,309 3,918 
  4th  3,949 6,162 10,111 -8,403 -5,386 -13,789 -3,678 
Top 1,992 5,123 7,115 -19,500 -7,441 -26,941 -19,826 
Average 5,448 6,636 12,084 -7,230 -4,743 -11,973 111 
Data source: Office of National Statistics, 2009; in £. 
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As shown in Table 3, the tax-transfer system has trimmed the income share going to the top 20 percent from 51 percent 
to 44 percent, while lifting the income shares of the bottom quintiles from 2.5 percent to 6.8 and 6.9 percent to 11.3 
percent respectively. Thus the impacts of redistribution are more pronounced for households in the top and bottom 
income quintiles - a feature analyzed recently in Blundell (2001), Bhattarai and Whalley (2009) and Mirrlees et al. 
(2010). 
Table 3. Share of Original and Post-Tax Income by Quintile, UK, 2009 
 Original income share Post-tax income share Impact of taxes & transfers, % 
Bottom 2.5 6.8 4.3 
  2nd 6.9 11.3 4.4 
  3rd  15.0 15.9 0.9 
  4th  24.9 22.3 -2.7 
Top 50.7 43.8 -7.0 
Data source: Office of National Statistics, 2009 
2. Models of Growth, Fiscal Policy and Welfare in UK 
Modelling exercises conducted under the Macro Modelling Bureau in the UK until the mid-1990s were based on time 
series econometric techniques rather than full scale general equilibrium analysis (Church, Mitchel, Sault and Wallis 
(1997)). As Keynesian economists, they generally argued that by spending more on goods and services and 
infrastructure, budget deficits were helpful in creating more jobs, reducing the unemployment rate, and raising the 
growth rate of the economy through various multiplier effects. They faced criticism from neoclassical economists who 
were more concerned about the adverse consequences of a public deficit on capital accumulation and economic growth. 
Under the classical Ricardian equivalence proposition, these theorists argued that private saving and the public deficit 
offset each other. 
Assuming dynamic general equilibrium mechanisms implicitly for the transmission mechanism of fiscal and monetary 
policies, Bean (1998) discussed the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policies in the previous thirty years using a 
time series analysis of inflation, unemployment, and current account balance. Wren-Lewis et al. (1998) suggested the 
novel idea of deconstructing the theoretical part from the econometric estimation, and reconstructing the theory from 
econometric estimation. Both of these exercises focused on macro models, and did not contain a micro-founded general 
equilibrium system that uses a multi-sectoral input-output and multi-household structure to study the path of inequality 
over the history of the entire UK economy. 
The stochastic growth model of Holland and Scott (1998) adopted the real business cycle (RBC) framework to study the 
business cycle facts relating to GDP, investment, work-hours and wages. It introduced shocks to preferences of 
households, and technologies of firms, but skipped growth and redistribution issues that require explicit specification of 
heterogeneity of firms and households. In a similar vein, with a dynamic macroeconomic model, Hansen and Prescott 
(2002) have shown how the Malthusian model with fixed land and variable labor inputs in a production function fitted 
the English economy well from 1250 to 1800 while the Solow model with constant returns to scale technology matches 
the empirical facts better for the last two centuries, as capital could be substituted for labor resulting from technological 
advancements. These two models were designed with a single representative household and firm, to explain growth, but 
obviously not to show the impacts of fiscal policy on income distribution. 
By including public goods in the household utility functions, and public capital in the production function, Bruce and 
Turnovsky (1999) measure the impact of tax and spending policies on growth and welfare on the basis of analytical 
solutions of a dynamic macroeconomic growth model. Two of their conclusions state that an increase in the income tax 
rate reduces the growth rate but raises the private consumption ratio, with no effect in the interest rate, and spending on 
infrastructure raises the growth rate. However, two of their conclusions are counter-intuitive. The authors also state that 
the consumption tax does not affect the growth rate, and the increase in government consumption has no effect on 
growth rate or interest rate. 
Such paradoxical conclusions from the analytical solutions of this model must have been due to lack of any 
labor-leisure choice, inter-temporal allocation of time, and the labor supply function for households, or competition 
across firms for inputs. 
By ignoring the role of heterogeneity of households and firms in welfare analysis, this model neither tackles the issue of 
redistribution nor captures the impacts of backward and forward linkages among industries. It is not possible to study 
the evolving composition of production, employment and trade and the distribution of income with this model. 
There is recent compelling econometric evidence that changes in the mix of taxes and government expenditures have 
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both short-run and long-run effects on economic growth: Gemmell, Kneller, and Sanz (2011) estimate a pooled mean 
group estimator using data for 17 OECD countries from about 1972 to 2004, and find that a move to non-distortionary 
taxes (and/or “productive” expenditures) has a relatively rapid and persistent impact on growth. This is entirely 
consistent with the results of the simulations reported in our paper. 
3. Dynamic CGE Tax Model of UK Economy 
Whalley (1975) constructed the first applied general equilibrium model of the UK economy, calibrating it to a 
micro-consistent input-output dataset, to simulate the comparative static impacts of tax changes on the economy. 
Piggott and Whalley (1985) updated this work. The dynamic CGE model presented here builds on forward-looking 
Ramsey (1928) type dynamics, and is an attempt to put theory, data and policy together. This is made possible by recent 
innovations in information processing, and the computational procedures required for the dynamic general equilibrium 
modelling of the UK economy (Rutherford (1995), and Bhattarai (2007)). 
The DCGE model underlying the current study is close to Bhattarai and Dixon (2014), but this paper focuses on the 
growth and redistributive impacts of fiscal policy, rather than on the equilibrium unemployment in the UK considered 
in that study. 
The model in this paper is a numerical counterpart to the abstract theoretical Walrasian concepts for a dynamic 
economy reported in Hicks (1939). It is an advance over the comparative static general equilibrium analysis pioneered 
in Whalley (1975) because it incorporates a) inter-temporal preferences of households over consumption and leisure, b) 
choices of firms of the optimal amount of capital and labor inputs, c) a government with inter-temporal balance in its 
revenue and spending, and d) a dynamic equilibrium in the country‟s balance of payments with respect to the rest of the 
world. Given the constrained inter-temporal optimization by households with standard CES preferences and firms with 
CES technology and CET functions for tradable commodities, this model is able to capture the wide-ranging income 
and substitution effects of changes in relative prices due to changes in tax policies and government spending activities. 
This makes it possible to evaluate the impacts of these policy changes on the process of growth, investment, income 
redistribution and the evolution of the entire UK economy in the 21st century. The functional forms of the model 
equations are as given in the next section. 
3.1 Preferences 
The model adopts standard Ramsey-type time-separable constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility functions to 
measure the welfare of households in each period. 
They engage in intra-period and inter-temporal optimization and substitute consumption and leisure based on relative 
prices, interest rates, wage rates, tax rates and public spending in equilibrium. Demand resulting from this forms 
multiple nests of goods and services in the economy. Commodities      
   are aggregated to a single composite 
consumption good      
   in the first nest and then that composite good is combined with leisure    
   for utility, 
U   
    
  . Finally utilities are aggregated over time to form life-time utility for each household   
 . Thus the problem 
of household   can be stated as:  
     
   ∑     
 
   
  
    
    
   ⇒    
    
    
    
    
    
      
                                                
subject to an inter-temporal budget constraint of the form: 
[∑    (     
 )    
       (     
 )    
 
 
   
]                                                                               
 [∑    
  (     
 ) ̅   
                  
     
 
 
   
]                                  
Here tax rates on consumption, wages and capital income     
     
       are set by the policy makers who aim for 
optimality and revenue neutrality in the process of tax reform with transfers   
 . The solution requires evaluations of 
Euler conditions for each household. The demands for ten categories of households for each of ten commodities 
requires the evaluation of 100 demand functions in each period, or 10,000 equations for a horizon of 100 years. Misch, 
Gemmell, and Kneller (2013) have explored the question of whether models that maximize growth yield the same 
optimal tax rates as models that (like ours) maximize ”welfare” -which may be difficult to parameterize- both for the 
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case  where government provides public services, and where it provides public capital. Their model is based on a 
representative household with an infinite lifetime, and they do not allow for a labor-leisure tradeoff. It turns out that 
their different assumptions are associated with very similar optimal growth rates, which suggests that our findings are 
likely to be relatively robust to the choice of the form of the utility function. 
3.2 Production Technology 
Each firm in the model has a unit profit function       . This is defined in terms of prices of commodities - the 
composite of prices of domestic sales        , exports        , and prices of primary inputs         and intermediate 
inputs     . Firms maximize profit subject to their technology constraints as: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥        (    𝜓        
𝜎𝑦−1
𝜎𝑦   𝜓      
𝜎𝑦−1
𝜎𝑦 )
1
𝜎𝑦−1
  𝜃        𝜃 
𝑑 ∑𝑎               𝜃     𝜃 
𝑑   
 
   
               3  
subject to the production technology: 
      𝛺    [          
𝜎𝑝−1
𝜎𝑝         
𝜎𝑝−1
𝜎𝑝 ]
𝜎𝑝
𝜎𝑝−1
                                                             4  
Here 𝜓   and 𝜃  are share parameters,  𝑦  and  𝑝 are elasticities of substitution in trade and production, 𝑎    
are the intermediate input coefficients giving the economy wide forward and backward linkages across firms and 
𝛺    is the exogenous total factor productivity. Sector specific capital        accumulation occurs as: 
𝐼                     −1                              (5) 
The real returns (    ) from investment across sectors are determined by the marginal productivity of capital that adjust 
until the net-of-business-tax returns are equal to the cost of capital across sectors       . The nominal interest rates set by 
the central bank should be consistent to these real rates in the long run. The wage rate of each household h,   
 , equals 
the marginal productivity its own labour. 
3.3 Trade Arrangements 
Economy is open to trade. Domestic firms supply products differentiated from their foreign counterparts. 
Wholesalers are modeled as following an Armington specification in deciding how much to buy in the domestic 
markets        and how much to import from abroad  𝑀     while supplying goods  𝐴     to the economy 
(equation 6) taking as given export and import prices,       and  𝑀    in the global market (in equation 7). The 
choices of consumers between imports and domestic consumption depend on the elasticity of substitution   𝑚  
between domestic supplies and imported commodities; with share of domestic supplies,      
𝑑   . Exports 
       and imports of UK are similarly based on the theory of comparative advantage with differentiated products 
as in equation (3). 
𝐴     (  
𝑑    
𝜎𝑚−1
𝜎𝑚        
𝑑 𝑀   
𝜎𝑚−1
𝜎𝑚  )
𝜎𝑚
𝜎𝑚−1
                          (6) 
The trade is balanced over time in value terms, so: 
∑      
 
        ∑  𝑀   𝑀   
 
                                  (7) 
The UK economy, being one of the most liberal economies in the world, has almost no tax on exports, and has minimal 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers on imports. 
3.4 Government Sector 
The government receives revenue from direct and indirect taxes and tariffs as in equation (8). These taxes are 
distortionary and affect the marginal conditions of allocation in consumption, production and trade, causing shifts in the 
demand and supply functions of commodities. It can adopt either a balanced budget, a deficit budget, a cyclically 
balanced budget, an inter-temporally balanced budget, or it may simply peg the deficit to a fixed debt/GDP ratio. The 
structure of taxes depends on the circumstances of the economy, policy debates, and rules based on conventions and 
international commitments made in treaties or agreements (i.e. EU or G20). 
 
Applied Economics and Finance                                          Vol. 2, No. 3; 2015 
26 
 
 
(8) 
 
People‟s preferences for public goods determine the degree of freedom the government is given in choosing the size of 
the public sector relative to aggregate economic activities. 
3.5 General Equilibrium in a Growing Economy 
Equilibrium in the goods, labor, and capital markets occurs when the demand and supply sides balance each other, as 
stated in equation (13), but more specifically as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The left hand sides (LHS) and right hand sides (RHS) of these equations contain first order Euler conditions resulting 
from the dynamic optimization by consumers and producers with respect to relevant commodities or inputs. In each 
period the empirical version of the model solved here contains ten Euler equations of household demand for ten 
commodities, ten first order conditions for each of ten types of labor, and ten types of sector specific-capital. In addition 
there are export and import demand functions for tradable sectors, and revenue and spending equations for the public 
sector in each period. 
The essence of this model can be summarized in four points. First, the general equilibrium path of the economy, 
{ } 
  and {    } 
 , is a stable and dynamically efficient long run sequence of prices and quantities given by the 
Marshallian forces of demand and supply balance across all markets in each period and over the entire model horizon 
(in equation 13, and equations 9 to 11). Second, such dynamically efficient allocations results from the system of 
relative prices of commodities and services, wage rates and interest rates for each period that guarantee market clearing. 
Their numerical values entirely depend on the parameters of preferences and technology, showing the behavioral 
responses of consumers and producers in the economy as shown in equation (12). Third, when a model is properly 
calibrated to the benchmark micro-consistent data set, relative prices in equilibrium are consistent as a Pareto optimal 
allocation of resources in the economy as in equation (14). Finally a computable model such as this can provide answers 
to key policy questions for the benevolent government that can choose policies that generate the most equitable 
distribution of welfare across households to maximize the social welfare function of the economy as in equations (15). 
The relative price system in equilibrium (12) is determined solely in terms of parameters representing preferences of 
households and technologies of firms and initial endowments of capital and labor. Actually how these substitution and 
share parameters in consumption and production implicitly determine the relative prices can be stated as: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The price system thus depends on a) share and elasticity of substitution parameters in preferences of households  
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 𝛼 
    
    
    
    
    
    
      
   on the demand side b) elasticity of substitution and input share parameters firms 
   
𝑦 𝜓  𝜃  𝜃 
𝑑  𝑎     and  𝛼𝑝   
𝑝     on the supply side c) share and substitution elasticity parameters 
   
𝑑    
𝑚  𝑚   for international trade d) tax-transfer policy parameters     
     
        
   on the policy side, and  
e) initial factor endowments   ̅ 
       , and, rates of growth and depreciation and the cost of capital across sectors, 
 𝑔        for benchmarking the steady state. 
The vector of relative prices includes composite price of domestic supplies      , the price of domestic output  
       , exports        , and imports   𝑀    , and the wage rate for each type of household      
   and the user 
cost of capital across sectors       , the real return by firms       : {                           
           𝑀   } 
 
. 
This price vector is obtained by solving for the zero excess demand across all markets as: 
{ } 
 :        { } 
  𝑆{ } 
                              (13) 
Given the sequence of these relative prices, { } 
  it is possible to solve for the sequence of equilibrium quantities, 
{ } 
 .  This quantity vector includes optimal consumption-leisure and labor supply choices of households 
{  
    
      
   𝑆   
 }
 
 
 to maximize the temporal and the life time utility; optimal capital and labor input choices and 
decisions on domestic sales to maximize profits, exports and imports by firms as 
{          𝐼              𝑀    𝐴   } 
 
 and a sequence of revenue and spending choices of the government { 𝑉  𝐺 } 
  
to maximize the social welfare function {𝑊 } 
 . Finally: 
 : {
  
    
    
      
   𝑆   
      .     
𝑉   .           𝐼        .      𝑀    𝐴     𝑉  𝐺  𝑊 
}
 
 
  {    } 
    (14) 
The income redistribution effect in the model occurs not only through the differentiation in the initial endowments of 
households, but also through variations in tax rates on labor and capital income, as well as affecting the rate of VAT on 
the consumption of goods and services. Differentiated rates of subsidies and transfers according to various criteria make 
the income redistribution process more complex. 
The optimal design of the tax system, however, requires finding which of these tax instruments are cost effective in 
raising a given amount of revenue causing the distortions in the optimal choices of households and firms. It is common 
to apply numerical methods to find the solutions of these models for an empirical policy analysis. 
3.6 Social Welfare Function and Measures of Inequality 
Model solutions were used to compute Gini coefficients for each period in order to measure the impacts of tax policy 
reform on income distribution. Since the level of lifetime money metric utility is the most relevant indicator of the 
welfare of house-holds, the focus here is on growth and inequality in it as caused by the changes in the relative prices 
that are distorted by fiscal policy measures including taxes, transfers and public spending. The level of welfare of every 
household can rise if the growth rate is higher. This is as a result of more consumption of goods and services. 
However it should be taken into account that not every household may benefit in the same proportion; richer households 
often benefit more from changes than poor households. More equality of income, between a lower growth rate, can 
reduce the level of the lifetime utility of every household, as they have less for consumption and leisure. This is clearly 
demonstrated in the solutions of the DCGE model reported below. 
Even more difficult questions arise while choosing an appropriate social welfare function, which requires a comparison 
of levels of utilities of all types of households in the model. The question of how much weight should be given to the 
sequence of utilities of individual households, {   1  1              1   1  } 
  in the social welfare function is an 
issue of philosophical controversy. While the maximin criterion of Rawls (1971) requires finding the welfare level of 
the lowest income household as the basis for an improvement in social welfare, a weak equity axiom of Sen (1974) 
suggests a policy that generates more equality as measured by lower values of the Gini coefficients. Thus the ranking of 
alternative policies is possible by computing these coefficients from the model solutions to achieve distributional 
objectives. In general such social welfare functions are to be determined by the dictates of the policy makers or 
representatives of people, and implicitly take the functional form as follows: 
      {𝑊  𝑊  1      1  } 
         (15) 
It is possible to get the optimal rates of taxes, transfers and spending by constraining the model to revenue neutrality, or 
social welfare neutrality, to be consistent with the principles set out in Mirrlees (1971), or in Diamond and Mirrlees 
(1971). When tax rates are properly designed in this manner, these can not only reduce the risks due to income 
uncertainty for low - as well as high income households, but also ensure that the economy moves along its long run 
steady state growth path, mitigating the impacts of shocks and distortions as seen in the recent recession. The model 
results allow one to measure the impacts of changing industrial composition of output, income, investment and 
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accumulation of capital on the inequality in utility levels of households, as the amount of commodities that enter into 
the household utility functions are ultimately determined by these factors. 
4. Data for the Benchmark Economy 
Sectoral share parameters of this dynamic CGE are estimated or calibrated using the 2009 version of the 
input-output table of the UK economy. Share parameters  𝛼 
    
𝑝   
𝑚 𝜃  𝜃 
𝑑  from these input-output and income 
tables are used to decompose the labour and capital income and consumption across households. Direct and the 
indirect taxes and transfers     
     
        
   were constructed from the HMRC and HM-Treasury sources. 
Sensitivity analysis and literature search were used to assign the values of elasticity parameters 
(  
    
    
    
    
    
      
 ). Initial endowment of capital and labor for the initial year were constructed from the 
income share data in the input-output table. Then the labor force,  ̅   
 , was subject to exogenous growth, capital 
stock evolved according to the law of motion of capital as in equation (5). Income and consumption shares were 
constructed using Table 14 "The effects of taxes and benefits on household income, 2010/11" of Economic Trends 
from the ONS. This table provides details on the cash and in kind benefits, direct and indirect taxes and the 
distribution of pre and post-tax income for households in each decile. This framework also provides the data required 
to evaluate the efficiency implications of unifying the numerous benefits going to low income households as proposed 
by the Department of Work and Pensions in recent years (http://www.dwp.gov.uk/research-and-statistics/).
3 
Table 4. Benchmark Production Tax Rates, Prices, Income, and Demand by Sector 
 wL rK C I G X M τk τl 
Agri 3,394 7,916 15,502 815 0 2,242 9,121 0.065 0.455 
Prod 108,572 6,281 374,956 47,256 6,131 226,785 314,14 0.947 1.996 
Constr 47,246 39,310 7,167 112,246 0 1,604 1,409 0.074 0.186 
Dist 161,281 63,465 131,456 802 0 29,884 29,596 -0.805 -0.950 
Infcom 47,434 28,579 38,161 24,372 3,116 20,342 12,514 0.130 0.236 
Finins 56,890 67,445 45,928 118 0 52,559 11,823 -0.027 -0.095 
Rlest 6,794 84,153 139,527 4,576 0 614 909 0.054 2.169 
Prfspp 95,617 51,781 15,387 6,108 0 54,111 33,824 0.125 0.203 
Ghlthed 220,102 32,561 65,419 1,431 313,401 3,817 2,188 0.024 0.011 
Othrsrv 29,542 11,099 51,602 313 4,701 3,630 5,737 -0.006 -0.007 
Data source: ONS 2009. Units (except tax rates): £ million. 
 
Table 5. Benchmark Production, Tax, and Prices, by Sector 
 Leisure Consumption Income share Consumption share Income tax rate 
Deciles L
h 
C
h θh δh twi
h 
H1 2,577 38,163 0.0281 0.0627 0.0 
H2 7,451 52,401 0.0433 0.0552 0.32 
H3 14,230 66,740 0.0551 0.0624 0.32 
H4 21,877 80,983 0.0669 0.0850 0.32 
H5 28,269 95,550 0.0789 0.0966 0.32 
H6 35,535 109,917 0.0908 0.1067 0.32 
H7 41,156 130,916 0.1081 0.1078 0.32 
H8 46,294 154,484 0.1276 0.1323 0.32 
H9 54,041 178,551 0.1521 0.1409 0.40 
H10 73,363 292,582 0.2493 0.1945 0.45 
Data source: ONS 2009. Leisure and consumption in £ million. 
The above parameters are consistent with equilibrium in the demand and supply sides for each production sector, 
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income and expenditure sides of each category of household, and the government sector. The model assumes an inter- 
temporal balance of household and the government budgets within the model horizon, allowing for lending or 
borrowing, and deficits like the current one, in the short run. 
The values assigned to the key parameters of the model are given in Table 4. Further details of the micro consistent data 
set for 2009, Excel file with model solutions, and GAMS/MPSGE programmes, are available upon request. A counter 
factual tax scenario consists of implementation of a corporation tax at 20 percent, income tax rates as shown in Table 6, 
and a labor income tax of 20 percent. 
Table 6. Major Parameters of the DCGE Model of UK 
Parameters   
  𝑔    r     
  (    )  𝑦     𝑚   
     
  
Assigned values 1.55 0.02 0.03 0.98 0.1 2.00 1.5 3.0 0.20 0, 0.32, 0.4, 0.45 
  
 and     
 : Elasticities of substitution in consumption-leisure and intertemporal choices. 
 𝑦: Elasticity of transformation for exports and home sales;   : capital-labor substitution 
 𝑚: Trade (Armington) substitution;   
 : VAT rate;    
 : income tax rates 
𝑔   : steady-state growth rate; (    ): rate of depreciation in section i. 
 
With ten types of households, eleven production sectors and a horizon of 82 years, numerical methods were adopted to 
solve the model with the micro-consistent input-output table of the UK constructed by the Office of the National 
Statistics (ONS) for 2009. The simulations show how various tax and transfer mechanisms recommended in the reports 
of Meade et al. (1978) and Mirrlees et al. (2010) impact the choices of households and firms in the UK economy. 
5. Results on Redistribution 
The model solutions for the benchmark and counter factual scenarios provide the basis for the evaluation of the current 
tax and transfer system on both the functional and the size distribution of income for the next century, which then could 
be compared to the historical accounts presented in section 1. There were mainly two experiments of tax reform 
considered for this paper. First, the differentiated capital and labor input tax rates in the benchmark given in Table 4, 
were replaced by uniform tax rates on those inputs. Second, the income tax rate of the richest income category (decile 
10) was increased from 45 to 50 percent in the reformed system. While the functional distribution of income between 
capital and labor is broadly determined by their marginal productivities, as well as the amount of each factor used in 
production, in line with standard neoclassical principles, the size distribution on the income of the households has 
historical roots in the socioeconomic structure of the economy as explained in the introductory section above. 
Table 7. Redistribution of Utilities Before and After Tax Reforms in the DCGE Model of UK, in „000 utils 
 Household welfare in 2009 Household welfare in 2059 
Deciles Reformed system Current system Ratio Reformed system Current system Ratio 
H1 59.1 43.1 1.368 149.2 195.0 0.765 
H2 72.0 60.1 1.198 180.4 271.5 0.664 
H3 92.5 76.6 1.208 231.8 345.9 0.674 
H4 112.8 92.9 1.214 282.8 419.7 0.676 
H5 133.7 109.7 1.219 335.0 495.2 0.664 
H6 154.2 126.8 1.222 286.4 569.6 0.678 
H7 184.2 150.2 1.226 461.6 678.4 0.680 
H8 217.9 177.3 1.229 546.1 800.6 0.682 
H9 241.1 205.8 1.172 603.0 929.1 0.649 
H10 380.2 337.2 1.128 852.5 1,522.4 0.626 
Note: Constructed from results computed in Excel UK-GE-2013-HH-2070.xls. 
As can be seen from Table 7 the DCGE model illustrates that tax changes that enhance wellbeing in the short run are 
not necessarily growth enhancing and have a limited impact on income distribution. A reformed tax system may 
generate a favorable pattern of income distribution in the benchmark year of 2009, but such an effect is reduced 
significantly when the economy evolves over time. Income in 2059 will be about 4.5 five times the current level, with 
the distribution of income similar to that in 2009. However the proposed reforms are harmful to growth. The model 
results show that utility levels of households in 2059 would only be about 2.56 times more than that in 2009 on average 
under such tax reforms. Continuation of the tax-transfer system existing in 2009 thus dominates the various tax reform 
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proposals being considered in recent years. 
This warrants attention to the long run before any changes are implemented through tax reform. Mirrlees et al. (2010) 
are right in proposing "a progressive, neutral tax system" that consists of "fairer, less damaging, and simpler taxes than 
those that we have now". It is clear from the model computations that "Economic welfare could be improved by many 
billions of pounds if the taxation of income, expenditure, profits, environmental externalities and saving were 
reformed." The magnitude of the economic impacts from these reforms depend on complicated economy-wide income 
and substitution effects that characterize the flexibility of markets, as reflected in the elasticities of demand for and 
supplies of goods and factors of production over time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Redistributive Impacts of Policy: DCGE model analysis of money metric utilities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Redistributive Impacts of Fiscal Policy: Gini coefficients 
 
It is post-tax income, or the level of utility from the composite of consumption and leisure, that households care about 
the most. The paths of inequality for the poorest and the richest households computed from the model solutions are 
presented in Figure 2. It is clear from the counter factual solutions presented in dotted lines relative to benchmark in 
solid lines that the contemplated reforms in the system of tax and transfer can lower income inequality but not 
substantially. Income distribution can become more equal if less distortionary taxes replace more distortionary taxes, as 
shown by path of average values of utilities in Figure 3. The dotted line of Gini coefficients of life-time utilities in the 
counter factual scenario are very close relative of the solid line corresponding to the benchmark line in the Lorenz curve 
in Figure 4. The initial sectoral features of the economy underpinning these results are as given in Figure 5. These 
representative results of the DCGE model are ultimately determined by inter and intra-temporal preferences of ten 
categories of households and technological choices available to the producers in all ten production sectors and the 
design of the tax-transfer system as proposed in recent budget statements. These model solutions could fit to the 
available theories of distribution that emphasize ability or stochastic factors or individual choice or human capital or 
inheritance or educational inequality or life cycle decision or public choices for redistribution. 
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Figure 4. Lorenz Curve for Inequality of Lifetime Utility 
These redistribution results are generated from more complex paths of output, employment, investment, consumption, 
income, revenue, public spending, exports, imports and corresponding relative prices in the model economy. These are 
only indicative of the evolution of economy and further details on these are available upon request. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Sectoral Composition of Output in the UK 
The programmes and activities that the government can implement to achieve growth and redistribution objectives are 
limited by its inter-temporal budget constraint. While there are possibilities of designing the tax system to achieve 
dynamic efficiency in the allocation of resources and in the provision of public goods, including the maximization of 
positive externalities from investing in public services such as health and education and minimizing negative 
externalities from punitive taxes. The current balance between direct taxes (the income tax, national insurance, 
corporate tax and council tax) that bring about 60 percent of total revenue, and the indirect taxes (VAT/Excise and 
Business rates) for the remaining 40 percent, is not the best composition to minimize the burden of taxes and attain the 
optimal distribution of income. A careful analysis is required for assessment of how the degree of distortions that those 
tax instruments, or subsidies on education, health, R&D or input uses, cause changes in relative prices or in choices of 
consumers and producers in the economy. It is important to find out the ratios of revenues, spending and deficit to the 
GDP corresponding to those in Table 1, that are based on the model above. 
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While the right (optimal) blending of progressive income and corporation taxes with regressive national insurance 
contributions, council taxes and VAT, petrol and fuel duties, business and other taxes, is necessary to minimize the 
burden of taxes, the actual post-tax distribution is also influenced by the allocation of public services among households. 
Thus it is important to consider the general equilibrium impacts of these revenue and spending sides simultaneously to 
assess the impacts of fiscal policy on growth and redistribution before policy decisions. Thus the proper quantification 
of the economic effects of policies on equity, efficiency in allocation, growth and sectoral composition of output and 
employment over time is a task that can be done only with a more elaborate dynamic general equilibrium model of the 
UK economy such as the one presented here. Bhattarai, Haughton and Tuerck (2015) present a similar analysis for the 
US economy. 
6. Conclusions 
Income inequality in the UK was highest during the peak phase of the industrial revolution around 1850. This is the 
time when the UK was the economic leader in the global economy, with a sustained growth rate of per capita income of 
1.5 percent. Greater concerns about the plight of ordinary workers in the 19th century led to actions by trade unions, 
politicians and philanthropists that resulted in the enactment of a series of redistributive tax and transfer that changed 
the focus of public finance to an egalitarian modern welfare state by the middle of the 20
th
 century. U-shaped trends in 
income inequality from 1950 to 2010, in contrast to the Kuznets curve hypothesis, in both the original and the post-tax 
income, have caused a lot of discomfort and tension among people and policy makers, particularly when considering the 
very minimal contribution of recent fiscal policy reforms towards generating economic growth. 
An attempt is made here to develop a dynamic multi-sectoral, multi-household general equilibrium (DCGE) model with 
taxes and transfers and public spending, calibrated to the micro-consistent structural features of household preferences 
and technological features of firms from the input-output table for year 2009, and public finance accounts of the UK 
economy. The model results are used to study the equilibrium paths of quantities and prices resulting from the optimal 
choices of households, firms and the government who play important parts in both the supply and demand sides of the 
entire UK economy and its evolution in the 21st century. From studying the scenarios of this model, it has been possible 
to show how tax and transfer policies can be designed to prevent income inequality rising further while ensuring that 
growth rates of various sectors of the economy are complementary to each other in the steady state. Whether the 
growth-enhancing and inequality-reducing objectives could be achieved in the long run depends on labor-leisure and 
consumption-saving choices of low- as well as the high-income households, and on changes in the use of capital or 
labor inputs by firms in response to the public policies that often aim to achieve a higher rate of growth with greater 
equality of income and utility for all types of UK households. It is also clear from the model that tax reforms designed 
to tackle short-run problems may have very detrimental effects on long run growth and may not be helpful in reducing 
the inequality in the distribution of income over the long term. A sustained rate of economic growth is consistent to an 
optimal level of inequality. Greater equality in income alone does not guarantee greater welfare for everyone, no matter 
what the configuration of the social welfare function is. The bottom line is that the average levels of consumption and 
utility cannot grow when the economy is not growing. 
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A Data Appendix 
                   Micro-consistent Data for Benchmarking: Input-Output Table of UK: 2009 
 
Table 8. Input-output Transaction Table, 2009 
 Agri Prod Constr Dist Infcom Finins Rlest Prfspp Ghlthed Othrsrv 
Agri 3,127 12,686 250 1,622 8 0 0 15 112 20 
Prod 7,256 289,576 35,007 66,800 13,040 6,002 622 11,790 71,029 6,674 
Constr 426 4,722 57,324 13,139 1,639 4,300 9,765 2,075 6,725 784 
Dist 974 17,089 3,467 60,804 4,062 13,401 696 9,064 14,481 1,855 
Infcom 227 6,245 1,444 18,376 15,795 13,174 1,261 9,884 9,890 3,483 
Finins 863 14,741 4,369 11,293 2,729 20,750 44,549 5,918 6,781 1,233 
Rlest 139 1,558 1,980 15,065 1,157 3,938 1,139 1,723 5,356 723 
Prfspp 790 25,019 16,794 43,919 19,727 26,786 4,538 76,723 33,101 12,561 
Ghlthed 32 2,502 1,511 5,298 1,107 2,560 3,370 9,068 48,167 782 
Othrsrv 77 938 100 1,725 3,085 939 51 2,201 4,869 6,628 
Data source: ONS 2009. Units: £ million. 
 
Table 9. Consumption of Households by Sectors in UK, 2009 
 Agri Prod Constr Dist Infcom Finins Rlest Prfspp Ghlthed Othrsrv 
H1 435 10,520 201 3,688 1,071 1,541 3,915 432 1,835 1,448 
H2 671 16,224 310 5,688 1,651 2,377 6,037 666 2,831 2,233 
H3 854 20,663 395 7,244 2,103 3,027 7,689 848 3,605 2,844 
H4 1,037 25,073 479 8,790 2,552 3,673 9,330 1,029 4,375 3,451 
H5 1,223 29,583 565 10,372 3,011 4,334 11,008 1,214 5,161 4,071 
H6 1,407 34,031 650 11,931 3,463 4,985 12,66 1,397 5,937 4,683 
H7 1,676 40,532 775 14,210 4,125 5,938 15,083 1,663 7,072 5,578 
H8 1,977 47,829 914 15,769 4,868 7,007 17,798 1,963 8,345 6,582 
H9 2,358 57,037 1,090 19,997 5,805 8,355 21,224 2,341 9,951 7,850 
H10 3,864 93,463 1,786 32,767 9,512 13,692 34,779 3,835 16,307 12,863 
Data source: ONS 2009. Units: £ million. 
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Table 10. Pattern of Income Distribution by Income Deciles in UK in 2009 (in £ „000) 
 Bottom 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th Top All 
Household (in mln) 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 26.2 
Original income 3.6 6.6 9.9 13.6 18.4 26.6 35.2 44.1 57.4 105.6 32.1 
Cash benefits 6.1 8.1 8.4 8.2 7.3 6.0 4.7 3.5 2.4 1.9 5.6 
Gross income 9.6 14.6 18.4 21.8 25.7 32.6 39.9 47.5 59.8 107.5 37.7 
Direct taxes 1.1 1.4 2.1 2.9 3.8 5.7 7.7 10.3 13.9 25.6 7.5 
Disposable income 8.5 13.2 16.3 18.9 21.9 26.9 32.2 37.3 45.9 81.9 30.3 
Indirect taxes 3.5 3.2 3.6 3.9 4.5 5.1 5.7 6.3 7.3 9.4 5.3 
Post-tax income 5.0 10.0 12.6 15.0 17.4 21.8 26.5 31.0 39.0 72.5 25.0 
In-kind benefits 7.4 8.1 7.7 7.5 7.2 7.7 7.3 6.4 6.0 5.6 7.1 
Final income 12.4 18.1 20.3 22.5 24.6 33.7 33.7 37.3 44.6 78.1 32.1 
Source: ONS Table 14: Average incomes, taxes and benefits by decile group of all households, 2010/11. 
 
Table 11. Structure of Public Revenue and Expenditure in UK in 2012/2013 (£ billion) 
Sources of revenue Revenue (£bn) %  Expenditure item Spending (£bn) % 
Income tax 155 (150) 25 (27)  Social protection 220 (194) 31 (28) 
National insurance 107 (99) 17 (18)  Personal social services 31 (32) 4 (4) 
Corporation tax 39 (43) 6 (8)  Health 137 (122) 19 (18) 
Excise tax 47 (46) 8 (8)  Education 97 (89) 13 (13) 
VAT 103 (81) 17 (15)  Transport 21 (22) 3 (3) 
Business tax 27 (25) 4 (5)  Defence 40 (40) 6 (6) 
Council tax 27 (25) 4 (5)  Industry, Agr, Employment 19 (20) 2 (3) 
Other 107 (79) 17 (14)  Housing & Environment 28 (27) 3 (4) 
    Public order and safety 31 (35) 4 (4) 
    Debt and interest 51 (44) 7 (11) 
    Other 53 (73) 7 (10) 
Total 612 (548) 100 (100)  Total 720 (696) 100 (100) 
Source: OBR and HM Treasury (Gorge Osborne 2013) – Budget statement, March. Figures in parentheses refer to 2011/12. See 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/junebudget_diagrams.htm  and http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/ and 
http://budgetresponsibility.independent.gov.uk/ . 
 
Notes： 
1
Based on time series data available at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/. 
2
Public finance in the UK, until 1815, was limited to heavy borrowing to finance military and naval expenses during 
wars, and redeeming such debts using revenues from rents, royalties and indirect taxes in peacetime. Equity issues were 
ignored in the traditional feudalistic or mercantilist mind-set of .the rich man in his castle, the poor man at his gate, God 
made them high and lowly and ordered their estate., even after the Magna Carta (1215) and the Glorious Revolution 
(1688) that transferred political power to the people and the parliament. In the four cannons of taxation of equity, 
certainty, convenience and economy, Adam Smith (1776) was more concerned for efficiency than for redistribution. 
Later on, many socialist reformers and radical thinkers including William Wilberforce, Robert Owen and Karl Marx 
became more concerned with the deteriorating living conditions of workers. They advised unions to organise and agitate 
for more equal rights, higher wages and better working conditions. They also strongly argued against the iron law of 
wages that existed then, despite rising trends of labor productivity. The substitution of relatively cheaper capital for 
labor during the process of industrialisation was a cause of rising productivity. 
This movement raised the number of MPs representing workers like Phillip Snowden, who in "The Socialist Budget" 
booklet of 1907 wrote that "the test of civilisation is in the extent to which the people as a whole enjoy the blessings of 
national progress"," the existence of a rich class, whose riches are the cause of poverty of masses, is the justification for 
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the taxation of the rich" and the "existence of a rich class is a danger to the state". 
3
Sectoral aggregation from 97 sector input-output Table for this model: Agric: Agriculture [1-3]; Prod: Production 
[5-39]; Constr: Construction [41-43]; Dist: Distribution, transport, hotels and restaurants [45-56]; Infcm: Information 
and communication [58-63]; Finins: Financial and insurance [64-66]; Rlest: Real estate [68.1-2-68.3]; Prfspp: 
Professional and support activities [69.1-82]; Ghlthed: Government, health & education [84-88]; Othrsrv: Other 
services [90-97]. 
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